Uvira: Here’s why Tshisekedi funds militia commanders as clashes escalate
Fresh concerns are mounting over Kinshasa’s growing reliance on Wazalendo - “patriots” in Swahili – militias, following reports that Brig. Gen. Fabien Dunia Kashindi, the commander of the FARDC’s 33rd Military Region, recently met Wazalendo commanders operating in Uvira Territory and handed them USD 70,000.
Made up of – among others – local self-defense militias formed in villages and communities, and former fighters from earlier armed groups who switched sides, the Wazalendo are not formally part of the regular army, FARDC, but many operate in coordination with it. They are not a single organized army, but a loose umbrella label used in eastern DRC for pro-government local militias that Kinshasa mobilized to fight the M23 rebellion which resurged in late 2021 and has since expanded its territorial control. The rebels are fighting to protect Congolese Tutsi communities and other minorities and defend against hostile militias operating in the region such as the Rwandan genocidaires known as FDLR.
The cash delivery comes amid worsening insecurity in eastern DRC and follows the recent visit of Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Guy Kabombo Muadiamvita to Uvira on May 24.
Officially, Kabombo’s mission was to assess the security situation and review FARDC operations in South Kivu. Local reports indicate that he visited the headquarters of the Uvira operational sector and attended a briefing with officials from the 33rd Military Region.
Sources say the funds given to Wazalendo commanders originated from Kabombo’s visit and were intended to boost morale among militia commanders as fighting intensifies. The episode has revived a deeper and more urgent question: why does President Félix Tshisekedi continue to place Wazalendo militias at the center of the security crisis in eastern DRC?
Kinshasa portrays the Wazalendo as “patriotic” local defenders fighting to protect their communities and land. However, critics argue that this marker masks a dangerous proxy strategy. By relying on irregular armed groups rather than exclusively on formal FARDC units, the Congolese state can benefit militarily from militia operations while attempting to distance itself from abuses committed on the ground.
This approach creates a serious accountability gap. Wazalendo fighters are not conventional soldiers operating under a transparent and disciplined chain of command, nor are they structured actors bound by formal peace agreements. When abuses occur, they are often dismissed as the actions of “self-defense” groups, even when those same groups have received weapons, ammunition, money, political backing, or operational support from state authorities.
For Kinshasa, the Wazalendo serve a political and military purpose. Some FARDC commanders have been reluctant to deploy regular troops into costly frontline battles. Wazalendo fighters, by contrast, are easier to mobilize, easier to rally with “nationalist rhetoric,” and easier to deploy into dangerous zones with limited incentives.
However, this same informality and lack of discipline have made them a serious threat to civilians.
Human Rights Watch has documented grave abuses by Wazalendo fighters in South Kivu, including beatings, killings, extortion, illegal roadblocks, and attacks on civilians, particularly Congolese Tutsi communities. The organization has also reported that the Congolese army has continued to provide weapons, ammunition, and financial support to Wazalendo militias, warning that officials who knowingly support abusive armed groups may be complicit in the crimes they commit.
The UN Group of Experts on DRC and Congolese civil society organizations also documented patterns of extortion, killings, looting, and harassment of civilians in areas where Wazalendo groups operate, particularly in villages and trading centers where state authority is already weak.
A confidential December 2025 report leaked to Jeune Afrique warned the Congolese parliament that, despite receiving an estimated USD 48 million annually, Wazalendo groups had become increasingly “disorganized” and “uncontrollable,” undermining the FARDC and terrorizing civilians in areas where the state has little effective presence.
The central question is no longer whether Kinshasa is using the Wazalendo, but who will hold them—and their sponsors—accountable.
If Wazalendo fighters kill, loot, extort, or terrorize civilians after receiving arms, money, or political protection from Kinshasa, responsibility cannot end with the militiamen on the ground. It must extend up the chain of political and military sponsorship.
As commander-in-chief, Tshisekedi cannot celebrate the Wazalendo as patriots when they serve his security strategy, then deny responsibility when they commit atrocities.
For Tshisekedi, using the Wazalendo to violate ceasefire agreements is relatively low-risk, since the militias are not party to the peace deals.
