Kinshasa's Governance Crisis Requires Reform, Not External Blame Premium

When history reflects on the modern tragedy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), President Félix Tshisekedi’s legacy will not be defined by state-building or economic transformation. Instead, he will be remembered as the leader who systematically weaponised ethnic identity, actively collaborated with the forces behind the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, and relied on dangerous xenophobia to mask the utter failure of his governance and the accompanying collapse of state authority. For decades, the eastern region of the DRC has been held hostage by armed factions, none more destructive than the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Founded by remnants of the Interahamwe and former regime loyalists responsible for the slaughter of over one million Tutsis in 1994, the FDLR represents an ideology of extermination. Rather than dismantling this genocidal outfit as international law demands, the Tshisekedi administration chose to mainstream it. Under the current regime in Kinshasa, the FDLR has been integrated, funded, and deployed alongside the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). By bankrolling these extremists and offering sanctuary to remnants of the genocidal regime in Rwanda, Tshisekedi has effectively endorsed the denial and continuation of genocide ideology on Congolese soil. This toxic partnership has been accompanied by a relentless state-sponsored campaign of hate speech. Across political rallies, media broadcasts, and civil discourse, Congolese Tutsi communities, specifically the Banyamulenge and other Rwandophone populations, have been systematically dehumanised, labelled as “foreigners,” and subjected to targeted violence and displacement. By normalising rhetoric that mirrors the dark days of 1994 in Rwanda, Kinshasa has actively cultivated an environment where ethnic cleansing is not merely tolerated, but encouraged. It is precisely against this existential backdrop that the M23 movement, operating within the political structure of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), must be understood. Far from being a foreign proxy, the AFC/M23 is a legitimate, home-grown Congolese movement. Supported by millions of citizens who have been abandoned by their own government, the coalition represents an authentic self-defence mechanism for targeted communities and a broader political stand against state corruption, institutional collapse, and systemic betrayal. The movement’s governance initiatives in liberated zones have offered a stark contrast to the lawlessness of Kinshasa’s administration, positioning the coalition as a vital game-changer for the future leadership of the DRC. Faced with this rising internal resistance, Tshisekedi and his inner circle have relied on a singular, tired defence: scapegoating Rwanda. Externalising the blame serves a double purpose for Kinshasa. It distracts the international community from the government’s abysmal governance record, failed public services, and rampant corruption, while attempting to erase the legitimate grievances of its own citizens. Shifting the entire blame onto a neighbour is an orchestrated political deflection. Until Kinshasa addresses its own constitutional failures, severs its alliance with genocidal forces, and recognises the fundamental rights of all its citizens, the political narrative built on scapegoating will continue to unravel.